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Abstract  
 
In the context of a mixed economy of welfare, public policy in the UK and elsewhere has long 
promoted third sector involvement in delivering public services. A growing research literature 
consistently highlights the challenges third sector organisations face engaging with a demanding 
public services commissioning environment, but it tends to lack a theoretical basis and can offer 
misleading accounts of third sector organisations as relatively passive and powerless in the face of 
wider forces. This article argues that third sector organisations actively operate within and seek to 
shape a commissioning context which advantages some strategies and some types of organisation 
over others. To provide stronger theoretical foundations for understanding public services 
commissioning and the third sector, the concept of 'strategic selectivity' (Hay, 2002) is applied to in-
depth qualitative longitudinal data from third sector organisations delivering a range of public 
services. The article contributes new theoretical insights into the dynamic ways in which social 
policies and public services are organised. The analysis highlights how differently positioned 
organisations seek to read, navigate pathways through, and transform an uneven public services 
commissioning landscape.      
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Introduction 
For over thirty years public policy in the UK and elsewhere has explicitly promoted a mixed economy 
of social welfare services, where public bodies, private firms and third sector organisations are 
variously involved in shaping and delivering services (Powell, 2019). In a mixed welfare economy, the 
state can provide, fund or regulate services (Hills, 2011), but under the continuing sway of New 
Public Management (NPM) and quasi-market reforms from the 1990s, the guiding vision has been 
towards a state which purchases and regulates the delivery of public services by competing 
independent providers (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). Successive governments across the political 
spectrum have encouraged and invested in the 'third sector' of charities, voluntary and community 
groups and social enterprise to engage more fully in delivering public services (Rees and Mullins, 
2016), building on a much longer history of charitable and voluntary involvement in welfare services 
(Lewis, 1999). Recent Conservative dominated governments in the UK have continued to promote 
the service delivery role of the third sector, as seen in the Coalition government’s ‘Open Public 
Services’ agenda (HM Government, 2011), and subsequently in the minority Conservative 
government’s ‘Civil Society Strategy’ (HM Government, 2018).  
 
Yet the hope of putting the resources and purported distinctive features of third sector organisations 
to use in improving public services has caused considerable debate. Whilst some elements of the 
third sector embrace or support these developments (ACEVO, 2003; 2015), others are pragmatically 
cautious (Blackmore et al, 2005; Clark et al, 2009) or openly critical (Benson, 2014; 2015). The 
debate surfaces the contested politics of the third sector, and public services. Underlying these 
different positions is a common representation of relatively powerless and resource-fragile third 
sector organisations encountering a monolithic environment of public service markets orchestrated 
through commissioning processes. What is missing is a more nuanced consideration of the active 
real-world dilemmas for different kinds of third sector organisations engaging in this area. In urging 
caution against entrenched debates around commissioning, Rees et al (2017: 191) note a lack of 
empirical evidence and call for ‘further grounded research into the realities of commissioning 
especially at the local level’. 
 
There is gathering recognition that third sector participation in public services does not occur on a 
level playing field. The ‘third sector’ is not a homogenous entity but a diverse aggregation of 
different kinds and sized organisations. Debate has increasingly focused on the challenges faced by 
smaller, local, third sector organisations, squeezed by competition from larger, national 
organisations and private companies. The Government’s Civil Society Strategy, for example, argues 
that the current public service delivery model favours large companies who can navigate complex 
commissioning systems, carry risk and bid competitively, whilst simultaneously failing to ‘recognise 
the added value that small and local organisations can bring’ such as local knowledge and support, 
additional resources, flexibility and commitment (HM Government, 2018: 105-6).  
 
There is thus acknowledgement of how the public services landscape presents different 
opportunities and constraints for different organisations. How might this differentiated landscape be 
usefully conceptualised and understood? Informed by Hay (2002), this paper argues that the third 
sector is involved in a strategically selective public services commissioning environment, which 
operates to structure opportunities in ways which advantage some strategies and some types of 
organisation over others. This idea animates our attempt to make better sense of the ways in which 
third sector organisations variously experience and navigate a complex and ever-changing landscape 
of public services. Strategic selectivity, we suggest, is an approach which can embrace the complex 
contingencies of wider commissioning structures (‘context’) and how third sector organisations (and 
others) seek to shape and navigate a course through this environment (‘conduct’). Drawing from 
qualitative longitudinal evidence of change within the third sector, the paper seeks to contribute to 
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our understanding of public service delivery, commissioning, and the third sector in social policy. 
This approach gives due attention to the agency of third sector actors and the strategies they adopt 
in social policy fields, without assuming that this is either even or unconstrained.  
 
In the next section we set our argument in the context of a growing body of literature on public 
service commissioning and the role of the third sector. This is followed by an account of how 
strategic selectivity might provide some theoretical grounding to take forward contested debates in 
this area. Then we outline the methodological basis of the empirical research which supports our 
argument, before moving on to explore qualitative findings that highlight the significance of both 
‘context’ and ‘conduct’ in the navigation of commissioning landscapes. We provide an extended 
discussion of the theoretical approach and empirical findings and reflect on their implications in 
conclusion. 
 
Commissioning public services and the third sector 
Allied to the New Labour government's 'Third Way' promotion of a mixed welfare economy and 
contestability in public services, government funding of the third sector in the UK changed in both 
scale and form during the 2000s. It grew from a total of £10.5bn per year in 2000-01 to £16.6bn per 
year in 2009-10, after which it has remained fairly stable at around £16bn per year, representing in 
2016-17 some 31% of total income for the sector (Hornung et al, 2019)1. At the same time, the 
balance has shifted away from grant funding towards contracts and fees: the ratio of the aggregate 
value of grants to contracts and fees changed from 1:1 in 2000-01 to 1:4 by 2014-15 (Bénard et al, 
2018). The government's financial presence in the third sector is, however, concentrated in larger 
organisations and those operating primarily in the fields of core public services (Clark et al, 2009). 
 
The deepening relationship between the state and the third sector during the New Labour years was 
part of a wider trend in the development of competitive tendering and quasi markets from the late 
1980s (Rees, 2014; Sturgess, 2018). Since then a complex public service market architecture has 
been constructed, involving new models, systems, occupational structures and training for the 
commissioning and procurement of public services (Bovaird et al, 2014). A substantial research, 
policy and practice literature has developed around commissioning generally and on the experience 
of third sector organisations in particular. Commissioning is often held to be a broader process of 
coordinating services to solve social problems or meet needs, rather than simply the procurement of 
services through tendering and contracts. However, the notion of a rational commissioning cycle - 
moving sequentially through understanding needs and identifying priorities, developing proposed 
outcomes, organising and investing in suitable responses, and evaluating results – appears to act 
more as a heuristic device than a description of practice (Rees, 2014). In the conflation of 
‘commissioning’ with ‘procurement’, it is argued, a range of options for organising the delivery of 
services are closed off. Grounded research on commissioning identifies much more varied, 
fragmented and contested practices than suggested in strategic documents and diagrammatic 
representations of the process (Bovaird et al, 2014; Miller and Rees, 2014; Rees et al, 2017). 
 
Much of the literature on third sector involvement in commissioning and public service delivery 
reports the challenges faced by many third sector organisations. Concerns gravitate towards two 
poles: a set of operational challenges and a deeper set of existential anxieties. First, research points 
to a range of difficulties gaining access to and maintaining positions within public service 
commissioning systems (Martikke and Moxham, 2010; Lloyds Bank Foundation for England and 
Wales, 2016; Aiken and Harris, 2017). The concern is whether commissioning and procurement 
processes prevent many third sector organisations from playing a full and meaningful part in public 
service delivery. This could be through tendering requirements, such as track records, quality 
assurance systems and balance sheets which act to preclude many organisations from engagement. 
Or it could be through doubts about the managerial and operational capabilities required to deliver 
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and account for complex services with demanding output or outcome expectations on reduced 
budgets. These concerns invariably lead to calls for a variety of reforms to structures, systems and 
payment mechanisms, alongside investment in awareness raising, training and capacity building 
support for third sector organisations and commissioners alike (Gash et al, 2013). 
 
A second set of concerns strike more fundamentally at the contested heart of what it means to be a 
third sector organisation. Anxieties concentrate on how involvement threatens valued and 
distinctive qualities associated with third sector activity, such as independence, a purported 
collaborative ethos, flexibility and close relationships with service users, advocacy and commitment 
to organisational missions (Buckingham, 2009; Milbourne, 2013; Milbourne and Cushman, 2015; 
Civil Exchange, 2016). Taking on contracts for public services, it is suggested, enables commissioners 
to determine third sector activities and formalises relationships with service users, intensifies 
competition, involves formal or tacit ‘gagging’ relationships and risks mission drift. These concerns 
are more intractable, and often become the well-spring for more critical interventions raising 
searching questions about commissioning and public service delivery in principle. 
 
The empirical literature on third sector experiences of commissioning has been remarkably 
consistent over time. The same pattern of experiences recurs, albeit in slightly different sets of 
circumstances, which may give some confidence in the findings. However, there are some common 
limitations. Methodologically, most studies provide only cross-sectional pictures. There is often also 
an implied normative framing at work, favouring collaboration over competition. Further, an explicit 
theoretical grounding seems to be absent in many contributions, which restricts the possibilities for 
deeper understanding of the structures, contexts and processes at work. An exception is provided by 
Milbourne and Cushman (2015), who draw on theories of isomorphism and governmentality to 
identify worrying overarching trajectories of change and fragmentation for the third sector, as a 
consequence of involvement in commissioned public services. However, the authors recognise the 
limitations of these theoretical framings, in that they readily gloss over ‘the complexity of responses 
visible at the level of everyday organisational dilemmas and activities’ (Milbourne and Cushman, 
2015: 482). Arguably, critical accounts of the ‘big picture’ overlook differentiated practices, 
experiences, dilemmas and positionings, and pay insufficient attention to agency within third sector 
organisational contexts (Buckingham, 2012). This paper responds to this gap. 
 
Strategic selectivity 
There is a need for a framework, then, that can allow for a keener sense of the interplay between 
context - of how commissioning shapes action and experience - and conduct - an appreciation of the 
dilemmas and decisions of differently positioned and resourced actors within this. For this we turn 
to the concept of ‘strategic selectivity’, formulated by the political scientist Colin Hay in order to 
highlight the iterative relationship between 'structure' (context) and 'strategy' (conduct), and 
particularly the opening up and closing down of political and institutional possibilities (Hay, 2002). 
For our purposes, ‘strategic selectivity’ involves four inter-related assumptions which together help 
provide deeper insight into commissioning processes and, in this case, third sector experiences.  
 
First, the context or environment is ‘strategically selective’ in that it ‘presents an unevenly contoured 
terrain which favours certain strategies over others and hence selects for certain outcomes while 
militating against others’ (Hay 2002: 129). Context is not an overwhelming grid of given power 
relationships which predetermines some outcomes and forecloses others. Rather, it is presented as 
a complex, actively shaped institutional environment which offers an uneven array of opportunities 
and constraints. Some actors, narratives and strategies are privileged and rewarded, and others 
disadvantaged and penalised, but actors work strategically both within and on that selective context.  
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Second, then, actors are viewed as at least partly strategic, in as much as they can develop and 
revise skilled ways of realising their intentions and pursuing their interests, whether these are 
framed as normative causes or instrumental positioning. As Hay suggests: ‘It is the intention to 
realise certain outcomes and objectives which motivates action. Yet for that action to have any 
chance of realising such intentions, it must be informed by a strategic assessment of the relevant 
context in which strategy occurs and upon which it subsequently impinges’ (Hay, 2002: 129).  
 
Third, actors are regarded as being more or less oriented to the context, such that they attempt to 
read and understand the rules, ways of working and possibilities for action: ‘to act strategically is to 
project the likely consequences of different courses of action and, in turn, to judge the contours of the 
terrain’ (Hay 2002: 132). This reading of context can only ever be partial, fallible and ‘sense-made’. It 
is never directly apprehended by actors but always discursively mediated, interpreted and 
translated: ‘actors have no direct knowledge of the selectivity of the context they inhabit. Rather they 
must rely upon on understandings of the context...which are, at best, fallible. Nonetheless some 
understandings are likely to prove more credible given past experience than others.... Context comes 
to exert a discursive selectivity upon the understandings actors hold about it’ (Hay 2002: 212).  
 
Finally, action may have direct intended and unintended effects on the context, but it also leads to 
strategic learning. Actors are reflexive, such that, again fallibly, they ‘routinely monitor the 
consequences of their action (assessing the impact of previous strategies, and their success or failure 
in securing prior objectives)’ (Hay, 2002: 133). Strategic action is then reformulated through ongoing 
interpretations of a changing context alongside learning about constraints, enabling factors and 
skilled approaches.  
 
The concept of strategic selectivity was developed as a general recursive model of strategic action in 
political environments, helping to explore the ‘asymmetries of access and power in particular 
institutional terrains’ (Raza, 2016: 216). It arose out of the broader 'strategic-relational' view of the 
state, which offers the basis for a complex macro-analysis of the political economy of contemporary 
capitalist societies (Jessop, 2016). This approach has been influential in macro social policy 
scholarship through Jessop's analysis of welfare state restructuring, accounting for the shift from a 
Keynesian welfare national state to a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime (Jessop, 2000; 
2002). 'Strategic selectivity' has been applied in discussions of local environmental politics (Jonas et 
al, 2004), higher education (Dickhaus, 2010) and trade liberalisation (Raza, 2016), but to our 
knowledge has not so far informed more detailed analysis of social policy or questions of public 
management. 
 
Our use of ‘strategic selectivity’ to illuminate the world of third sector navigations of public service 
commissioning involves its application at a more concrete, meso-level. Strategic selectivity helps us 
in understanding how differently positioned third sector actors are making strategic assessments of 
(what they perceive to be) the relevant contexts in which they operate, forming judgements about 
what matters most and what the likely consequences of the different courses of action available to 
them might be. Here, context can be presumed to refer to any configuration of policies, institutional 
architectures, cultures and organisational arenas, in which participants are relationally positioned, 
oriented towards and conduct themselves. Third sector organisations are involved in effortful 
attempts to understand the strategically selective 'rules' of the various fields in which they operate 
and to seek convincing ways of navigating a journey through them. In doing so, they shape the 
context of which they are a part. The framework, we believe, makes way for understanding 
differential, situational and contingent third sector experiences, in which conduct and context are 
inherently interlinked, without losing sight of the wider picture.  
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We use the framework first through case study narratives to explore how different aspects of 
conduct and context play out within the field of third sector commissioning. We develop it further 
within the discussion section through an analysis of our data against the four assumptions within 
strategic selectivity outlined above, and a consideration of how this adds to existing literature.       
 
Methods 
We draw on data from a qualitative longitudinal study of change within the third sector2. Qualitative 
longitudinal research enriches our understanding of “the processes by which change occurs, and the 
agency of individuals in shaping or accommodating to these processes” (Neale et al, 2012: 5). It 
emphasises the importance of longer-term journeys for understanding current positions and 
possibilities, and so supports our interest in the experience of third sector organisations in 
navigating strategically selective commissioning environments. The study explores change within 
and around third sector organisations in four contrasting case study settings in England. These were 
originally selected, in an earlier phase of research, for diversity in terms of geographical spread, size, 
scope, and field (Macmillan, 2011; Macmillan et al, 2013). Table 1 provides summary information 
about the four cases.  
 
 
TABLE 1. Third sector commissioning experiences – summary information for four cases 
 
Case study setting Policy field Scale  Size 
(income)
3
 
Commissioning 
experience  
Fig: a major, national 
family support 
organisation, operating 
through numerous local 
projects across England 
and Wales.  
Family support National Major Extensive. Numerous 
contracts from different 
funders and at different 
scales being tendered 
for and delivered at any 
one time.  
 
Birch: a large, local 
information, rights and 
advice organisation based 
in an urban area in the 
north of England. 
 
Advice Local Large  Extensive. Numerous 
contracts through a 
range of commissioners 
over time.  
Hawthorn: a local, family 
support project that has 
grown from an informal 
peer-led support group to 
a provider of mixed family 
support services.  
 
Family support Local Medium Developing. Successfully 
funded through two 
rounds of local authority 
commissioning.  
Larch: a set of small, 
neighbourhood-level 
activities in a regeneration 
area in the north of 
England. Here we focus 
on a social enterprise 
supporting disadvantaged 
people through 
engagement with 
horticultural activities. 
 
Community 
development 
Neighbourhood Small  Minimal. Part of a 
consortium of sub-
contracted organisations 
in a prime provider 
model.   
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The research involved three waves of fieldwork in each of the cases, during 2017, 2018 and 2019. 
Data was mainly collected through interviews with a range of respondents, including trustees, chief 
executives, staff, volunteers, service users, partners, competitors and funders. The dataset contains 
over 120 transcripts of interviews, including repeat interviews with the same individuals. All 
interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. These were supplemented by the 
collection of background information, such as annual reports and other strategic documents, along 
with observations during regular visits to the fieldwork sites and attendance at various 
organisational meetings throughout the study period. Additionally, as indicated above, the current 
research builds on an earlier phase of research which commenced in 2010. Altogether, the 
organisations have been engaged in the research for approaching ten years, providing considerable 
temporal depth.   
 
Qualitative longitudinal research enables researchers to explore how issues may unfold over time. 
Commissioning emerged as an important theme within the analysis of our first wave of interviews. It 
was then pursued as a line of enquiry within subsequent waves of fieldwork, and as a ‘through line’ 
(Saldana, 2003) within our analysis. We undertook further analysis with a sub-set of 40 interviews 
from across our four cases which focused most intensely on commissioning – including those with 
key staff, their partners and funders (e.g. commissioners). Following Thomson (2007: 580) our 
further analysis involved ‘the analytic practice of reading data in two directions’, first by following 
and (re)constructing the commissioning stories of each of our individual cases over time, and 
second, bringing the cases into conversation with each other. Both ‘readings’ were guided by the 
analytical framework provided by Hay’s account of strategic selectivity. This is framed by and 
situated within our wider analysis of the full dataset, reflecting a qualitative longitudinal approach 
which allows for the ‘intermeshing of synchronic and diachronic, cross-cutting and longitudinal 
analyses’ (Neale et al, 2012: 5). Together this analysis provides new insights into the dynamic 
interplay of context and conduct within the third sector commissioning environment, highlighting 
both the shifting dynamics of the strategically selective context and the ways in which organisations 
have navigated and shaped it. The qualitative longitudinal approach allowed for an appreciation of 
the increasing significance of commissioning in each of the cases over time - we were able to 
observe how the context was shifting and becoming more salient. It also allowed for an 
understanding of how organisations had developed over time – we had followed their journeys as 
they navigated their way to get to the positions they were currently in.   
 
Findings 
How then does strategic selectivity work in practice in understanding the experience of third sector 
organisations engaging in the commissioning of public services? Our findings suggest that the 
commissioning environment represents a set of circumstances, rules, constraints and parameters 
within which voluntary organisations operate when trying to access the resources they require to do 
the things they want to do. These revolve around commissioning processes, including: pre-tender 
opportunities and commissioner capabilities; tender specifications, particularly in terms of financial 
and geographical scale; and contract terms and conditions, particularly partnership and staffing 
requirements. We suggest that these contextual factors work together to create a strategically 
selective environment which favours some organisations, and some responses, more than others.  
 
Our findings also highlight the significance of ‘strategic action’ – of the choices organisations make, 
and the strategies and tactics they adopt. These aspects of ‘conduct’ are highlighted through four 
specific dimensions associated with commissioning, which we illustrate through four contrasting 
case study accounts. These cover: shaping commissioning contexts before tenders are issued; 
assessing risks in order to decide whether or not to bid for a tender; considering when to work in 
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partnership, and when to compete; and finally when and how to adapt internal structures and 
behaviours to deliver contracts.    
 
Case study research in general is valued for its ability to capture complexity and multiplicity of 
themes. Here we use our cases parsimoniously, by using each one to illustrate a particular dimension 
of ‘conduct’ while also weaving in significant aspects of the ‘context’ – maintaining the integrity of 
case stories whilst also allowing cross-case analysis. Each, however, highlights additional elements of 
both context and conduct, not least because the two are inseparable. We return to the interplay of 
conduct and context, and to each of the assumptions within Hay’s conception of ‘strategic 
selectivity’, within the discussion section.     
 
1. Shaping commissioning contexts 
Third sector organisations are often assumed to be relatively fragile, resource constrained and 
rather powerless in the wider fields of public service delivery. It is important, though, not to 
overlook the explicit ways in which third sector actors seek to shape the context – through 
campaigning, lobbying and influencing public opinion – but also in sometimes quite subtle micro 
interventions in their local contexts. These can lay the ground for emerging path dependencies; the 
context is shaped and sets the parameters within which actors subsequently operate. The recent 
experience of case study ‘Birch’ demonstrates how third sector organisations are differentially 
positioned within strategically selective environments, but also how they can shape the 
commissioning context in ways which affect the development of tender specifications to which they 
may later respond.     
 
Like many local advice centres, Birch has experienced the sharp end of austerity. Over the past ten 
years it has faced cycles of relative stability and vulnerability as funding has come and gone, with 
associated rounds of redundancy, restructuring and new recruitment (reflecting on this, one 
respondent noted: ‘it’s what it’s like in many voluntary organisations, I think it’s a sort of a symptom 
of our times really’). In 2015 its local authority proposed to withdraw all funding for advice services 
across the city. While the local authority contract previously held by Birch was not its most 
significant financially, it was symbolically important and losing it would be a ‘big deal’. Few other 
funders supported generalist, open door, advice. The proposed loss of funding potentially affected 
many organisations, sending shock waves across the advice sector in the city. As one advice provider 
reflected: ‘there was such a storm kicked up’.  
 
Birch, as the largest and most significant advice centre in the area, worked behind the scenes with 
supportive councillors to try to save the funding. A working group to develop a longer-term advice 
services strategy for the city was established, and Birch took the lead on working with others to 
write the strategy. It made suggestions about how best to save money, including the proposal that 
advice services should gradually shift from face-to-face to telephone and web-based provision. The 
local authority followed the recommendations of the new strategy, including re-commissioning 
advice services. The tender specified that only one contract would be awarded (previously there had 
been a series of contracts with a number of individual providers), with a preference for a consortium 
approach, and included targets for how quickly the ‘channel shift’ move from face-to-face to 
telephone services should be implemented. Birch won the contract, leading  a partnership with 
three other advice agencies. While Birch was able to draw on its various resources to challenge the 
original decision, develop the strategy and ultimately win the new the tender along with a small 
number of partners; other advice providers in the city were less well positioned to be able to 
respond.  
 
As the contract was delivered, and as our research followed the organisation through time, staff 
discussed the move from face-to-face to telephone advice. The story of ‘channel shift’ told by 
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members of Birch initially highlighted how the organisation was responding to the stipulations of 
this latest contract with the local authority; that the change was the result of the wider 
commissioning context. Yet deeper research engagement revealed a more nuanced account of the 
organisation’s agency in shaping the strategic context in which its operational decisions are being 
made:  
 
“it’s what we’ve put in the advice strategy as a group of partners, and the council have 
bought into, it’s about where things are moving to generally” (B1, 017).  
 
It had the existing position, resources and skills to remain embedded in a set of relationships with 
other agencies and stakeholders, such that it was able both to lobby to protect some funding from 
the local authority and lead the development of the forward strategy for advice services. In doing so 
it was actively involved in shaping the context in which it and other actors, including the local 
authority, found themselves. It helped mould the selectivity of that context.  
 
2. Assessing risks and deciding whether to bid 
‘Fig’ was also involved in actively shaping the commissioning context, at both local and national 
level, but here we use it as an example of the ways in which organisations demonstrate agency 
through assessing risks in order to decide whether or not to bid for a tender. Fig grew steadily during 
the New Labour period and became significantly reliant on statutory sources of income. The first 
part of the 2010s was dominated by concerns about funding ‘cliff edges’ as large contracts came to 
an end, with associated cuts to income, services and staff. Learning from these experiences, its 
recent strategy has been to try and balance a small number of larger contracts with a much larger 
number of smaller contracts, and to position itself as a specialist provider:  
 
“It’s partly reflecting opportunities in the market…it’s partly about financial risk analysis, in 
as much as I would prefer the organisation to be specialist, neat, niche, edgy, doing risky 
services, you know, doing the services that others might be less confident to touch rather 
than doing massive multimillion contracts which are easier to cut and create cliff edges in the 
organisation …” (F1, 014). 
 
Significant organisational resources are invested in an ongoing assessment of both the environment 
and the performance of individual contracts, identifying future funding opportunities, building 
relationships, and developing, refining and reformulating responses. Structures and processes are 
designed to be ‘agile’ allowing the organisation to continually (re)position itself to ‘take advantage’ 
of new funding streams as they come on board. A sophisticated process has been put in place to 
respond to new tender opportunities, with specialist teams (including business development and 
legal support) dedicated to the task of rigorous assessment against a detailed set of criteria for 
judging organisational fit and risk. This strategy has helped to strengthen Fig’s position and re-secure 
a healthy financial trajectory.  
 
Across our cases it was reported that contracts have grown in scale, scope and complexity over 
recent years, signalling a more demanding commissioning environment. Fig’s resources - both 
financial and human – give it the capacity and capability to make careful judgments about the 
context within which it operates, including when and how to engage with commissioners, which 
contracts to go for and which to avoid, and when to walk away. These resources offer greater 
possibilities for autonomy and influence. The need for thorough assessments highlights the relatively 
advantageous position of larger third sector organisations, such as Fig, within a strategically selective 
environment.  
 
The ability and willingness to walk away from contracts at different stages of (re)tender and delivery 
is an important real and symbolic demonstration of agency: 
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“we’re not afraid to say “no” and we also say “no” to things that we are the existing provider 
of […] It is ultimately a commercial decision, but it is also about being able to deliver to our 
values...” (F2, 083).   
 
In actively seeking other sources of funding and investing its own reserves in supporting new service 
developments, Fig had been further managing the constraints of commissioning, and in doing so 
hoping to ‘take back some control’. Such strategic actions both respond to and shape the 
commissioning environment, at times contributing to commissioners revisiting and revising their 
approaches.  
 
3. Partnership and/or competition 
In Fig’s judgment, a period of intense competition with other providers has begun to give way to 
more partnership working. Here it is navigating complex sets of relationships not just with 
commissioners but also with other providers, while constantly jostling for position within the field of 
family support services. Fig’s scale, resources and reach open partnership opportunities up, but can 
also serve to close them down – through being viewed as a competitive threat by both small local 
organisations (for example, we heard concern about national organisations ‘who swoop in and 
…take all the money’) and in relation to other large national organisations. 
 
At the same time, smaller third sector organisations struggle to engage in a commissioning 
environment that favours organisations and strategies which can work across a broader scale. A 
common recommendation is to build scale through partnerships with others, for example by forming 
a consortium to bid for contracts or becoming a sub-contracted supplier of services to larger 'prime 
contractor' organisations. The horticultural social enterprise in ‘Larch’ highlights some of these 
challenges and responses to them. It was established in 2010 to engage disadvantaged people in 
therapeutic horticulture and has achieved considerable success in terms of building a diverse 
funding and reputational base.  
 
Growth, however, has been relative. It remains a ‘small’ organisation, which has shaped its ability to 
work within existing rules of the commissioning environment: while it operates on a very local scale, 
commissioning often doesn’t. Ever larger contracts – both in geographic and financial terms – have 
precluded it from bidding, compounded by riskier contract terms and conditions, such as payment 
by results and TUPE4 stipulations. As one member of staff from Larch reflected:  
 
“when you tender it’s a far more complex process [than applying for grants] and it’s really 
very rigid.  So, tendering is awful and it’s all the big boys that are gobbling up the tendering 
now” (L2, 069). 
 
Judging that a 'go it alone' strategy would be futile, the social enterprise made partnership 
arrangements with other local providers, including working as part of a consortium of organisations 
sub-contracted to a prime provider within a large commissioned service. Working with others has 
enabled it to engage with commissioning but has been the source of considerable frustration as 
neither funding nor referrals have flowed as anticipated through the supply chain. The organisation 
has been rendered relatively powerless, with little room for manoeuvre within contract terms that 
were not of its choosing: 
 
“I’m really unhappy about consortiums […] [T]he money doesn’t trickle down […] you get one 
prime provider, one lead organisation, they gobble up everything. They take all the money.” 
(L1, 034).   
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Rather than simply accepting the constraints imposed by its unfavourable position within a selective 
commissioning landscape, however, the social enterprise has exploited other opportunities afforded 
by being locally well-networked and well-respected. In response to a new tender specification, which 
was thought to favour much larger organisations, the CEO invited the commissioner to visit the 
social enterprise and observe first-hand the outcomes it (and, by implication, other small 
organisations) achieves, in an attempt to over-turn the contract rules and requirements and make 
their engagement a possibility.  
 
These experiences highlight both the strategically selective nature of the commissioning 
environment in which third sector organisations operate – sometimes favouring strategies of 
partnership and sometimes competition, whilst also tending to favour large organisations over small 
– and the strategic action of those organisations, constantly adapting and shaping that context on 
different levels.  
 
4. Developing internal structures and behaviours  
Third sector organisations also often adapt their internal structures and behaviours to maximise the 
opportunities available to them within the commissioning environment. ‘Hawthorn’ was established 
in 2004 as an informal, volunteer-run, family support organisation, but over time it has expanded, 
supported by grant funding and a local authority contract. In the process it has introduced more 
formal structures and sought to develop a ‘professional’ ethos, gaining and maintaining a position as 
a reputable service provider locally. Hawthorn’s recent experience highlights how key strategic 
decisions by commissioning bodies fundamentally alter the landscape of constraints and 
opportunities experienced by third sector organisations, and the dilemmas and responses this can 
contribute to. 
 
Between 2017 and 2019 Hawthorn’s attention was dominated by a (re)commissioning processes for 
family support services. Under the promise of economies of scale, the local authority initially 
proposed to bring several services together in a large tender covering a wider range of service users 
and across the whole County. Hawthorn was disadvantaged by this decision: it worked only at 
district level, and it could not meet the anticipated demands of delivering such a large contract on its 
own. The proposed contract appeared to favour larger or national private and third sector 
organisations. Faced with losing its existing work through this, it sought (like the social enterprise in 
Larch) to compensate for its lack of scale: it began to build collaborative links with similar 
organisations in other districts, to see if a consortium bid might be possible, but also it developed 
promotional materials to showcase its approach to larger bidders, in the hope of securing a local 
sub-contract. 
 
Late in the process, however, commissioners gained internal local authority approval to disaggregate 
the proposed tender into district-based lots, responding to concern that the existing approach would 
undermine local voluntary sector provision. At once the landscape of possibility for Hawthorn had 
changed. Smaller local organisations found themselves in a more advantageous position, whereas 
larger organisations from elsewhere might judge the new contracts as too small to be worth 
tendering for. Hawthorn was now in a highly competitive position to bid for its district-based 
contract alone: it no longer needed to market itself to other potential providers, and the impetus 
behind a consortium bid subsided. The landscape was selecting for certain organisations and 
strategies over others. However, other proposed terms of the tender, particularly a proposed 
‘payment by results’ mechanism, would prove to be more challenging for a relatively small 
organisation with limited capacity, expertise and working capital. Without the sophisticated expert 
capacity evident in Fig, Hawthorn’s managers and trustees had to set prices for the work by 
assessing and forecasting the likely numbers of families they would support, the resultant up-front 
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staffing and other costs, and the chances of gaining successful ‘outcomes’ from which payments 
would be triggered. 
 
Hawthorn’s tender was successful. The initial excitement of success after several stressful months of 
preparation was, however, quickly replaced by the anxiety of delivery. Hawthorn had felt little 
option but to bid for (what they had assessed to be) a risky contract with borderline viability. But 
with a reduction in targeted client numbers, difficulties demonstrating evidence of outcomes and 
payment in arrears, the challenges of retaining and motivating staff have intensified. Staff morale is 
at its lowest ebb in a working environment now characterised by the need to meet targets and 
complete paperwork. The worry across the organisation is whether all the effort has been worth it, 
and whether it is now rapidly losing its charitable ethos of flexible, relational work alongside clients: 
 
“sometimes our hands are tied […] we’ve got to deliver this number of sessions for this 
family, and we can’t do all of the nice stuff that we used to do for families” (H2, 088). 
 
Respondents discuss the risk of becoming less like a charity and more like a ‘cheap department of 
the county council – they set the targets, tell us how high to jump’. Having been in a position to win 
the contract, Hawthorn is now considering withdrawing from it. Just raising this possibility is helping 
to rebuild a sense of agency:   
 
“I think the fact that the organisation’s already stopping and starting to think, “Do we back 
out of this?” is a positive. Because you always feel better don’t you, when you feel you’re in 
control of something, rather than your destiny being controlled by somebody else. Which is 
how it feels at the moment” (H2, 087). 
 
Discussion 
As public policy continues to develop sophisticated processes for commissioning public services, 
existing literature has highlighted the struggles facing third sector organisations participating in such 
an environment (Rees et al, 2017). We add weight to these findings by evidencing the considerable 
challenges and frustrations that third sector organisations encounter within commissioning. It is 
resource intensive, requires organisations to have or invest in specific skills and expertise (in, for 
example, business development, marketing, impact measurement and partnership working), and it 
can contribute to a heightened sense of competition amongst third sector organisations5.    
 
The extant literature, however, tends to suggest that third sector organisations are passive 'takers' 
of a commissioning environment driven from elsewhere (Milbourne and Cushman, 2015). In 
response, they are sometimes encouraged to build their capacity to engage more effectively in 
commissioning, in effect to become more like larger organisations. Alternatively, they might opt out 
of public service delivery insofar as it is beyond their reach or poses too much of a threat to their 
values and principles. Our research, however, shines some light on otherwise overlooked aspects of 
third sector organisations in a commissioned public services environment. The theoretical approach 
and qualitative longitudinal analysis have enabled a more nuanced understanding of the granular 
experiences of different third sector organisations in navigating the commissioning environment. 
The approach draws attention both to the uneven landscape through which third sector 
organisations are travelling, but also their agency in pursuing strategies to improve their position 
and prospects. It attends to both 'context' and 'conduct'.  
 
Returning to the four assumptions at the heart of the idea of 'strategic selectivity', discussed earlier, 
emphasises the ways in which actors encounter and act within strategically selective commissioning 
environments. The first assumption is that a strategically selective environment represents a set of 
circumstances, rules, constraints and parameters within which third sector and other actors operate 
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and which favours certain strategies and organisations over others. Of particular significance were: 
first, the financial and geographical scale of tender specifications, alongside size thresholds 
precluding smaller organisations from bidding; second, contract terms and conditions, such as 
payment by results and TUPE requirements; and third, the sheer complexity of commissioning 
processes. Most of these parameters tend to operate in favour of larger organisations, with more 
resources available to bid successfully and to organise large scale delivery over a broader 
geographical scale. There are of course countertendencies and examples, such as attempts to tailor 
contracts specifically to enable smaller organisations to participate. Overall, however, current 
commissioning environments tend to select for strategies which favour those with existing or ready 
access to resources, such as investing in business development, competitive pricing, and 
supplementing bids with additional charitable resources. 
 
Yet organisations do not passively respond to this strategically selective environment. The case 
accounts also highlight the significance of conduct - the strategic action of third sector organisations. 
They are involved in shaping the context, as well as being shaped by it. The second assumption, 
then, is that actors are at least partly strategic. They seek to use what skills, experience and 
knowledge they can muster to understand the contexts in which they operate and through which to 
pursue their interests. All four of our cases were constantly reviewing and assessing their operating 
environments and devising and resetting strategies in this light. But each had different capacities 
and capabilities to do so. Fig’s financial and human resources, for example, enables a much more 
sophisticated and thorough assessment of the varied contexts in which it works or seeks to work, 
and arguably a wider range of options to pursue. Smaller organisations are more constrained in the 
strategic choices they have, and the resources to hand in making those choices. The social enterprise 
in Larch was pushed towards a strategy of seeking to join a supply chain led by another organisation 
because it did not have the capacity to bid alone for work it wanted to do. Hawthorn was in a similar 
situation until the contextual rules around it changed to favour smaller, local third sector 
organisations.   
 
Third, actors are assumed to be more or less orientated to the context. They seek to interpret and 
understand the rules, ways of working and possibilities for action, but readings of context are only 
ever partial. Two comparisons help demonstrate this. Fig and Hawthorn are both involved in family 
support, but at different organisational and geographical scales. Fig operates at national level and in 
lots of different localities. It can engage in and make sense of wider policies, developments and 
trends, as well as gain grounded insights from its local work. It uses this as part of its highly 
developed approach to business development. Hawthorn operates only in a single district within a 
larger county. It has less access to and knowledge of wider developments and trends, but has deeper 
knowledge of local conditions, practices and politics. It followed closely the emerging messages 
about the County Council's commissioning plans and initially sought to showcase its work and 
connections to potential large prime providers. Yet it was anxious throughout the process to find out 
more, including how the commissioning would work and who the prospective bidders would be.  
 
This leads to a second comparison. Both Hawthorn and the social enterprise in Larch are relatively 
small organisations struggling to gain footholds in their commissioning environments. But the extent 
to which they are oriented towards their contexts differs. The commissioning process for Hawthorn 
mattered a great deal. It felt compelled to be involved given the importance of this funding stream 
for its work. In Larch, by contrast, the social enterprise was involved in multiple activities funded 
through a range of different sources. It was somewhat less attuned to its commissioning context, 
and more oriented to other contextual dimensions, including the lives and circumstances of its 
volunteers and other community developments in its neighbourhood.     
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The final assumption in strategic selectivity is that action may have direct intended and unintended 
effects on context, but it also leads to learning, as actors routinely monitor the consequences of 
their decisions and strategies. All our cases were involved in indirect efforts to shape the contexts in 
which they work, which led to significant consequences: Birch, for example, led the development of 
a strategy which ultimately contributed to a change in how it delivers services, whilst Hawthorn 
engaged in local efforts to challenge the decision to procure services on a County wide basis, such 
that the decision's reversal opened up possibilities for it to win resources. Qualitative longitudinal 
research engagement with the organisations allowed for a closer real time appreciation of the 
unfolding of events, and how the organisations learn from their experiences, if not always in positive 
ways. Hawthorn's success in winning its tender, for example, has generated greater ambivalence 
once the realities and consequences of delivery have materialised. It is now considering whether to 
withdraw from the contract. The social enterprise in Larch has learnt by painful experience that 
supply chains do not always live up to their promise. Birch and Fig have learnt about and mitigated 
the risks of larger contracts, including the exploration of alternative models of financing services.        
 
Conclusions 
Much has been written about the difficult encounters many third sector organisations have with 
public service commissioning, yet overall the literature tends to lack the theoretical grounding 
through which to make sense of these processes and experiences. This paper contributes to the 
literature, and to broader debates around commissioning and public services, by deploying the idea 
of 'strategic selectivity' to shed theoretical light both on the differentiated experiences of third 
sector organisations and on the ways they seek to navigate pathways through an uneven 
commissioning landscape. Strategic selectivity offers a way of understanding how differently 
positioned organisations seek to read, travel through and transform that landscape. Third sector 
organisations cannot credibly be regarded as passive and powerless in the contexts in which they 
work. In principle these contexts are malleable, yet at the same time the approach avoids heroic 
assumptions about how much change can be effected, and acknowledges that actors are differently 
positioned within their contexts.     
 
Our analysis suggests several implications for policy, practice and research. If policy makers and 
commissioners are as committed to engaging the third sector in the delivery of public services as 
general rhetoric suggests, acknowledging the unevenness of the commissioning landscape, and the 
implications of the rules and parameters which they create, would be a good starting point. The 
findings should give third sector organisations some confidence in their ability to influence the 
environments in which they are operating; to recognise themselves as strategic actors, with the 
ability to shape – and not just be shaped by – the opportunities and constrains which the 
commissioning environment offers.  
 
It is also worth reflecting on the advantages and limitations of applying a 'strategic selectivity' lens in 
social policy analysis. To our knowledge it has not been used in any detail in this area, and references 
to it in social policy and other disciplines tend to use it to inform fairly high level and abstract 
discussion of the role and complex functioning of the (welfare) state in contemporary capitalism. 
Our approach has involved rendering the idea of strategic selectivity in concrete form, here in the 
case of commissioning public services. Doing so extends the reach and relevance of the concept. Our 
qualitative longitudinal analysis of third sector experiences has given temporal depth and detail to 
an otherwise cyclical dynamic of the interplay between context and conduct.  Our approach also 
highlights limitations. There is some tension over the notion of 'context', seen on the one hand as 
rather abstract and singular, but on the other in the idea of a more concrete, multiple, and complex 
array of different inter-related contexts through which actors travel. A more plural conception of 
context would suggest that further research might explore the different strategically selective 
dynamics in play in specific fields of social policy activity, such as children's services, criminal justice 
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or social care, and to investigate and compare the interplay of context and conduct over time in 
these fields. Empirical testing in different fields could then lead to further development of strategic 
selectivity as a theoretical approach.   
 
Notes 
1. The figures refer to total government income for the voluntary sector rather than for the wider 
third sector or civil society as a whole. The definition of 'voluntary sector' for these purposes 
focuses on registered charities, but excludes, for example, places of worship, independent 
schools and housing associations (see https://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac18/methodology-
2015-16/ for further information). 
2. Change in the making: A dynamic and relational landscape of voluntary action is a three-year 
qualitative longitudinal research study of change within the third sector, funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (award number ES/N010582/1). 
3. Based on annual income bands from the NCVO UK Civil Society Almanac: Micro (<£10,000); 
Small (£10,000-£100,000); Medium (£100,000-£1m); Large (£1m-£10m); Major (£10m-£100m); 
Super-major (over £100m) 
4. TUPE – Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) – the legal protection of 
employees' terms and conditions when the ownership of organisations / services is transferred. 
5. We report more directly on these experiences in a separate working paper (Ellis Paine and 
Macmillan, 2019). 
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